USA v. Samuel Bankman-Fried Court Filing, retrieved on March 15, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 26 of 33. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here III. A Very Significant Sentence Is Necessary for General Deterrence A very significant sentence of imprisonment is also necessary in this case to afford adequate general deterrence to criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). “Considerations of (general) deterrence argue for punishing more heavily those offenses that either are lucrative or are difficult to detect and punish, since both attributes go to increase the expedited benefits of a crime and hence the punishment required to deter it.” United States v. Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because economic and fraud-based crimes are more rational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, these crimes are prime candidates for general deterrence.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Mueffelman, 470 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (deterrence of white-collar crime is “of central concern to Congress”). Here, a sentence of 40 to 50 years is necessary to serve that purpose. The enormity and audacity of Bankman-Fried’s crimes has understandably captured the attention of both the public, generally, and those involved in cryptocurrency or finance specifically. Thus, the deterrent message and effect of the sentence imposed by the Court in this case will resonate significantly with any individual or institution tempted to engage in conduct similar to that of the defendant. This need for deterrence is especially important in the area of cryptocurrency, where some individuals have operated under the misimpression that they are unregulated, not subject to criminal laws, or can avoid scrutiny or significant jail time. Bankman-Fried contends that the loss of his reputation and finances is sufficient to deter him (and others who have seen what has happened) from further misconduct. (Def. Mem. at 66- 69). But that is simply not the case. As Judge Swain cogently explained in sentencing Peter Madoff: The Court is also very much aware that [the defendant] and his family have lost the assets, reputation, financial security and social position that they had enjoyed.… That punishment while indisputably severe is not alone sufficient to effect a punishment that is just, given the nature, magnitude and context of the crimes for which [the defendant] is being sentenced today. Many people and institutions have suffered the same fall from wealth, privilege and in many cases even basic levels of financial security as a result of the massive fraud. Ordinary wage-earning people who had planned for ordinary comfortable retirements are among the victims here too…. Proper punishment also requires a lengthy term of imprisonment, the punitive loss of [the defendant’s] personal freedom. Such a sentence is also necessary to serve the deterrence function of sentencing…. the world in which [the defendant’s] conduct took place is full of many temptations and opportunities to breach trust relationships for personal gain. The consequences of such behavior must be harsh to help deter others from taking the path of dishonesty and theft. United States v. Peter Madoff, No. 10 Cr. 228 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2012) (Sent. Tr. at 28- 29). That reasoning applies with greater force to this defendant. The studies cited by the defendant, on the other hand, are wrong, or at least do not apply here. (Def. Mem. at 66). The prospect of punishment, and not the severity, may be enough in some cases to deter. But not here. This case presents an appropriate opportunity for the Court to send a strong signal to market participants. See, e.g., United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 94 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming district court’s sentence which took into account, among other things, general deterrence and the fact that the sentence imposed “could have a powerful general deterrent effect because the case had attracted an unusually large amount of publicity”). A sentence of the length proposed by the defendant would have the perversely opposite effect: it would send the message that “the defendant’s crime is not so serious,” “the punishment is not so severe,” “it is not like the major frauds of the past.” Especially in light of the publicity to which the defendant points, an unjustifiably lenient sentence would encourage others who might be tempted to engage in fraud that the rewards of such wrongful activity may be worth the price. Bankman-Fried also argues that the negative publicity from the prosecution is enough of a deterrent. But simply because a case has been widely reported on and drawn notoriety does not suggest that imprisonment is not required to promote deterrence. As the Second Circuit has explained: [T]he circumstances referred to by the district court do not constitute punishment. The public nature of criminal prosecutions is part of our constitutional fabric; the public humiliation suffered by one prosecuted and convicted of a crime is an ordinary consequence of his conduct, not a condition imposed by the criminal codes or the judicial process. These circumstances, though adverse, are not what § 3553(a)(2)(A) means by “punishment.” Hence they cannot properly be viewed as fulfilling the need for the imposition of just punishment. And given that the more massive a fraud, the more likely it is that the prosecution will generate publicity, the logical extension of the district court's view—i.e., that Freedman’s public humiliation and the public nature of his prosecution were punishment enough—would mean that the more flagrant the crime, the less actual statutorily prescribed “punishment” it would require. And of course, the less punishment that is meted out, the less deterrent effect the sentence will have on others contemplating similar crimes. United States v. Cutler, 520 F.3d 136, 171 (2d Cir. 2008). Here, general deterrence is of the utmost important in this case, and that is why a lengthy term of imprisonment in line with other defendants who embezzled hundreds of millions or billions in customer funds is necessary. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 15, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. storage.courtlistener

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